In the early months of 1918, the British people were forced to face the fact that they might lose the war against Germany. There were a number of reasons why such a situation had arisen, but the greatest cause was the activities of the enemy U-boats in the Atlantic and around the coast of Britain. It was felt in some quarters that the source of the problem lay in the fact that the Germans had captured the Belgian ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend, but they were opposed by the admiral in command of the Dover Patrol. He was convinced that his attempts to seal off the Straits of Dover was working, and that the enemy submarines were having to sail around the top of Scotland – a considerably longer voyage.
Eventually, however, irrefutable proof arrived at the Admiralty that the U-boats were passing through the straits. As a result, the commander of the Dover Patrol was replaced by an officer of a very different character.
Vice Admiral Roger Keyes had already enjoyed an active career in which he had begun to earn the popular title of ‘The modern Nelson’. With a speed that shocked some of his new staff, Keyes came up with a plan, and immediately set in motion the means of achieving his aims. Using picked men from the Grand Fleet and the Royal Marines, and employing worn-out old cruisers, he intended to enter the enemy-held ports and sink the vessels as block-ships in the canal entrances.
At Ostend, this seemed fairly straight-forward, but Zeebrugge was protected by a mile-long mole protected by heavy guns in addition to the possibility of enemy destroyers being tied alongside. To deal with this problem, a ‘distraction’ force consisting of an ancient cruiser (the Vindictive) and two Mersey ferries would land seamen and Royal Marines to engage the enemy forces whilst the block-ships entered the harbour. At the same time, two submarines, filled with explosives, were to ram a viaduct connecting the mole to the mainland and destroy it, thus preventing re-enforcements coming to the aid of the enemy.
After two attempts were thwarted by the weather, the fleets sailed on 22nd April. What followed was a maelstrom of courage, initiative, and bold enterprise. At Zeebrugge, the raid was completely successful against heavy guns, entrenched defenders, and a change in wind direction. At Ostend, however, despite astonishing bravery, the attempt was entirely unsuccessful.
Unbowed (and annoyed) by the partial victory, Keyes returned to Ostend – this time leaving a cruiser, packed with concrete in the entrance to the canal. The canal was not blocked, but the ship remained there as a daily ‘insult to the enemy’.
The combined actions saw a total of eleven Victoria Crosses being awarded, and a further, incredible, six decorations for bravery every minute of the action. The example being set by the raids was used by the Royal Navy during the Second World War as a pattern for sea-borne operations against an armed enemy coast.
Unfortunately, the end of the war had seen the rise of the ‘Disenchantment School’ which, not only concentrated on the casualty rate, but eagerly spread the German propaganda version of events. Until now, this view has been widely accepted and constantly reproduced. ‘No Pyrrhic Victories’, however, re-examines the facts about a battle which rightly restored Britain’s pride in its Royal Navy, was greeted with acclaim throughout the Empire and amongst its allies, and sent the enemy reeling in shock and dismay.
E. C. Coleman served in the Royal Navy for thirty-six years, on board everything from submarines to aircraft carriers. He is the author of No Pyrrhic Victories, The 1918 Raids on Zeebrugge and Ostend - A Radical Reappraisal, destroying the myths that have arisen about what Churchill called 'the finest feat of arms of the Great War'.